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Attorney's Liens
Arthur F. Lustig*
N FORMER YEARS, AN ATTORNEY WAS PAID a fee "not as a salary
or hire but as a mere gratuity which a counselor cannot de-
mand without doing wrong to his reputation." I These customs
are long since past. The English rule that a counselor or bar-
rister has no right to charge for his services and that he cannot
enforce compensation no longer prevails in Ohio, 2 for example,
and in other states. Today, in most jurisdictions, an attorney's
right to payment for services rendered is protected by statute.
3
As of the end of 1955, thirty-one states had some form of an
attorney's lien statute.4 In the rest, including Ohio, there is an
absence of a general attorney's lien statute, though some liens are
provided for in some particular situations.
Dean George Neff Stevens of the University of Washington
Law School made the pointed statement that the average attor-
ney appears to have little interest in, nor does he realize the in-
adequacy of, the attorney's lien laws of his state; this is usually
the case, until he finds himself personally involved.5
There are two types of attorney's liens. First is the general
or retaining lien, also referred to as a possessory lien. This
general or retaining lien had its beginning in the early English
Common Law, being recognized as early as 1779.6 The general
lien attaches to papers, documents, money, securities, and other
property of the client which comes into the lawful possession of
the attorney in his professional capacity; the property may then
be retained as security for the payment for compensation for
the professional services rendered.7 This lien comes into ex-
istence by operation of law, and obviates the necessity of any
contract or agreement between the parties to the creation of
* B.A., Fenn College; M.A., Western Reserve Univ.; a Senior at Cleveland-
Marshall Law School.
1 Blackstone's Commentaries, Book 3, Ch. 4, p. 419 (Edited by W. H.
Browne, 1892).
2 Roberson v. Dalton, 55 Ohio Wkly. Law Bull. 3 (1910).
3 R. Berger, The Attorney's Lien in Federal Courts: A Protection That Is
Long Overdue, 39 A. B. A. J. 131 (1953).
4 G. F. Stevens, Our Inadequate Attorney's Lien Statutes-a Suggestion, 31
Wash. L. R. 2 (1956).
5 Ibid. This article contains a comprehensive survey of all existing attor-
neys' lien statutes in the United States as of Spring 1956.
6 Welsh v. Hole, 99 Eng. Rep. 155 (K. B., 1779).
7 George v. Walton, 36 Ohio Law Abstract 306, 43 N. E. 2d 515 (1942).
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the lien. Possibly the most peculiar feature of this lien is that
it is entirely passive in character. The attorney, while having
the right to retain as security for his fee the property of his
client, may not actively enforce his lien either at law or in
equity.8 For this type of lien, a client-state is treated the same
as an individual client.9 Moreover, this lien secures not only
just compensation due the attorney for any specific professional
services he has rendered, but also all sums due from the client;
that is, for the general balance due from the client for any serv-
ices rendered by the attorney.'0
In the absence of a specific statute permitting it, the re-
taining lien cannot be enforced by a sale of the property which
it covers." Even though the statute of limitations may have
run against the debt, the lien endures until the debt is paid,
hence the statute can in no way defeat it. 2
The second type of lien is known as the special or charging
lien. This type of lien is merely the right of an attorney to obtain
a charge upon a judgment, award or decree obtained by him for
his client. A second distinguishing characteristic of this lien is
that it is limited to costs, disbursements, and services in connec-
tion with the litigation from which the judgment, decree or
award has been produced. 13 It is in effect, therefore, simply
the attorney's right to enforce in equity a common law lien upon
a judgment or upon property which is the subject of a judgment,
to the extent of his claim. 4
The case of Cohen v. Goldberger sets forth the basis for the
attorney's lien.15 An action was brought by Cohen against Gold-
berger and Morganthaler for an accounting of certain assets of a
partnership consisting of Cohen and Goldberger. It was found
that Goldberger had transferred to Morganthaler a claim of the
firm against the United States Steel Products Company for
commissions earned under a contract with the company. Judg-
8 Wood v. Biddle, 7 Ohio Nisi Prius 225 (1896).
9 State v. Ampt., 6 Ohio Decision Reprints 699 (1879).
10 6 Ohio Jur. 2d 95, Atty. at Law, Sec. 80.
11 In re Wilson, 12 Fed. Rep. 235 (D. C. N. Y., 1852).
12 Mechem, Agency, 1889, 4th Impression Book 5, Ch. 1, Sec. 867, p. 728,
citing In re Murry, 3 W. N. 190 (1867).
13 F. D. Hall, Attorney's Charging Lien, 4 U. of Fla. L. R. 58 (1951).
14 Walcutt v. Huling, 5 Ohio App. 326 (1913). This case has been followed
in the more recent one of Hyers v. W. & S. Life Insurance Company, 33 Ohio
App. 333 (1913).
15 109 Ohio State 22 (1923).
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ment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and was affirmed in
the Court of Appeals.'" Thereafter, and before the judgment was
paid, two law firms filed their motion in the Court of Appeals in
which they stated that they were the attorneys of the plaintiff
who had agreed to pay them for their services one-half of the
amount which might be recovered, and asked that the same be
allowed as a lien upon the judgment. Cohen by answer admitted
the rendition of the services as claimed. The court ordered the
amount of the judgment plus interest paid to the Clerk of Court.
Then one Cramer filed an intervening petition, wherein he
claimed to be a partnership creditor and claimed the entire
amount of the judgment as partnership assets, arguing that the
attorney fee was an individual obligation of Cohen's. The court
decided the question as follows:
The contention of Cramer is based wholly on the proposition
that the attorneys are the individual creditors of Cohen,
and that the priority, if any, can arise only after all the firm
creditors of Goldberger & Cohen are paid in full, and the
balance, if any remaining, is ordered paid to Cohen as his
interest in the partnership. That position would be tenable if
it be conceded that the fund represented by the judgment
belongs to the firm, and not to Cohen individually, and if the
attorneys were general creditors of Cohen; but that would
put aside entirely the question of their interest in, or lien
upon, the fund produced by their skill and labor, and would
result in taking from them that which had thus been pro-
cured, and distributing it among general creditors of the
firm, probably leaving without remuneration of any sort
the attorneys but for whose efforts, presumably, the fund
would not have been procured or made available for the
payment of the creditors either of the firm or the individuals
composing it. The mere statement of that proposition dis-
closes its inequity.1
7
Quoting 2 Ruling Case Law, page 1069, the court continued:
This right, though called a lien, rests * * * on the equity of
an attorney to be paid his fees and disbursements out of the
judgment which he has obtained, and is upheld on the theory
that his service and skill produced the judgment, and in
accordance with the principle which gives a mechanic a
lien upon a valuable thing which, by his skill and labor, he
has produced.
The court concluded by saying:
10 Morganthaler v. Cohen, 103 Ohio State 328 (1921).
17 Cohen v. Goldberger, 109 Ohio State 26, 27, 28. This case has been fol-
lowed in the later decision of Newcomb v. Krueger, 36 Ohio App. 469 (1930).
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1958
ATTORNEY'S LIENS
We find no basis for the contention . . . that a lien cannot
be asserted by attorneys, in the absence of an agreement
with their client that they should have such lien.
From this case one may derive the proposition that the right
of the attorney to payment of fees earned in the prosecution of
litigation to judgment rests on the equity of the attorney to be
paid out of the judgment recovered by him, on the theory that
his services and skill instrumentally created the fund.
The right of an attorney to enforce the charging lien has
no statutory basis in the Ohio code. Only from a long line of
decisions by the various Ohio courts has it been determined that
such an equitable right does exist and that in proper cases the
courts of the state will enforce this lien.'8 This lien has been
held not to extend beyond the charges and fees in the suit in
which the judgment was recovered, and therefore not to cover
any general balance which may be due.19 Likewise, attorneys'
fees for professional services rendered in one case may not be
ordered paid out of funds recovered in a second case. Nor for
that matter, for any services rendered other than those in the
instant case in which the money was produced. 20
An Illinois court has held that an attorney, in response to a
subpoena to produce records as to the services rendered, cannot
refuse to obey the subpoena on the ground that his lien would
obviously be destroyed because the property would pass from
his possession.21 On the brighter side however, there is at least
some authority for the supposition that the charging lien may be
enforced in a like manner as the retaining lien, although the
attorneys' claim is barred by the statute of limitations.2
To appreciate the tenuous ground upon which both the
general and special liens rest in Ohio, one must carefully note
that the former is a completely passive lien and the latter is in
the nature of an equitable right which has no basis in Ohio
statutory law but is completely and utterly contingent upon the
will of the court for its enforcement.
18 6 Ohio Jur. 2d 98, Atty. at Law, Sec. 85. The U. S. Supreme Court in the
case of Winton v. Amos, 255 U. S. 373, 393 (1921), recognized the claim
against a lien upon a fund so produced as having a "curious analogy to the
salvage services of the maritime law."
19 5 Am. Jur. 395, Atty. at Law, Sec. 223.
20 Phillips v. Travelers Ins. Co., 18 Ohio Circ. Ct. (New Series) 356 (1911).
21 Ross v. Wells, 127 N. E. 2d 519 (IM., 1955). See also Reynolds v. Warner,
258 N. W. 462 (Nebr., 1935).
22 Mechem, op. cit. supra, note 12, at p. 735, Sec. 874, citing Higgins v. Scott,
2 B&Ad 413 (1831).
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A third and curious type of "lien" is the right of offset as
recognized in the common law.2 3 In Ohio, it is synonomous with
counterclaim. Essentially, this is the right of the attorney to ap-
ply all the client's funds received by the attorney against the
general balance of compensation due from the client for profes-
sional services. Some Ohio cases follow this view. An early
Ohio case, Diehl v. Friester,24 held that a motion to set off one
judgment against another is an appeal to the equitable power of
the court, to be granted or refused upon consideration of all the
facts. In granting such motion, the claim of the attorney for fees
will be respected. The right of an attorney in such a case is not
a specific lien upon judgments, but is a right which under cer-
tain circumstances a court may protect.
A similar line of reasoning was used in the case of Montalto
v. Yeckley.2 5 Plaintiff brought an action against defendant and
recovered a judgment which was appealed. While the case was
pending in the trial court, the defendant filed an amended answer
in the Court of Appeals setting up in effect that he had, during
the pendency of the action, purchased and received by assign-
ment from a third person a judgment against the plaintiffs, and
prayed that it be set off against the plaintiff's judgment. The
Appellate Court allowed the judgment assigned to the defendant
as a set-off in full satisfaction of the plaintiff's judgment without
making any allowance for attorneys' fees. Counsel for the plain-
tiffs insisted that the defendant's judgment should not be set off
so as to deprive them of their attorneys' fees for services ren-
dered. Their fee was contingent and was to be based upon an
agreed percentage of the amount that might be collected. They
had no lien on the judgment and no assignment of any part
thereof to protect their contingent fee. The court then discussed
the previous case of Diehl v. Friester and ended with the fol-
lowing:
The court's power to exercise discretion in the allowance of
a set-off finds its counterpart in the court's power to exer-
cise discretion with regard to attorneys' fees. If the claim
for fees is allowed, then the amount allowed to a defendant
as a set-off must be reduced accordingly. The trial court
herein refused to take into consideration attorney fees in
allowing the set-off to defendant. This action of the court
23 Stevens, supra, note 4, at 2.
24 Diehl v. Friester, 37 Ohio State 473 (1882).
25 143 Ohio State 181 (1944).
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was within its discretion and did not constitute reversible
error under the particular facts of this case.
26
The question naturally arises as to the situations which might
be presented to a court that could be valid foundations for the
granting of such relief.
The problems inherent in set-offs have not been dealt with
by many states. Several statutes 27 provide for the subordination
to the rights existing between the parties of the attorneys' lien.
One state28 requires that the executions not be set-off against
each other in such a way as to do injury to whatever lien the
attorney may have.
Other aspects of the attorney's lien are worthy of considera-
tion. A special or charging lien may be created by an express
contract between the attorney and his client.29 Therefore, a
contract of attorneys with their client, whereby they are to
have three-tenths of the proceeds of any judgment that they may
recover in an action to be instituted by them for such client,
creates an equitable lien in their favor on the proceeds of the
judgment recovered. 0 In a later case,31 it was held that an
attorney who successfully prosecutes a claim for a client on a
contingent fee contract of one-third of the amount recovered,
has a retaining lien upon a check issued by the Clerk of the
Court for the amount of the recovery. If, without the attorney's
consent, the client forcibly snatches the check from the hand of
the attorney and converts the proceeds to his own use, the
attorney has a cause of action for damages against the client
for such tortious act. It is interesting to note that the court
awarded to the plaintiff a judgment exactly equal to the amount
of his claimed lien.
32
Apparently, in Ohio notice to the judgment debtor of the
attorney's lien is necessary in order to protect it against a
bona fide settlement and payment of the debt by the debtor
26 Ibid., 185.
27 Alaska, Compiled Laws Annotated, Vol. 4 (1949), Sec. 26-8-1 (fourth)
(but see 1957 renumbering of Alaska statutes); Minn. Code, Vol. 2 (1953),
Sec. 481.13 (5).
28 Rev. Stat. Maine, c. 118, Sec. 28, Vol. 3 (1954).
29 5 Am. Jur. 394, Atty. at Law, Sec. 221.
30 Chapman v. Lee, 45 Ohio State 356 (1887); Larwill v. Smith, 65 Ohio
State 566 (1901). Dicta in the Chapman case has been criticized in Powers
v. Ruelbach, 66 Ohio Law Abstract 31 (1952).
81 Wheaton v. Chandler, 68 Ohio App. 474 (1942).
32 Ibid., 479.
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made in ignorance of the existence of the lien.33 An attorney
who has, by agreement with his client, an interest in the award
produced by his services, may enforce his lien against the
judgment debtor if the latter has been duly notified of the at-
torney's rights.3 4 However, although the attorney possesses a
share of the proceeds of the cause of action, he cannot, merely
by giving notice, impose on the tort feasor an obligation to ac-
count to him for his share; by such effect the attorney would vir-
tually be able to place himself in the position of the injured per-
son and he would be able to negotiate for settlement in that
light.35 Such notice may merely apprise the judgment debtor
that the attorney claims to have an assignment of a portion of
whatever may be paid. It may contain no assertion that what-
ever might be paid should be paid to the attorney, or that it
might not be paid to his client. Again, the notice may not truly
state the nature of the interest which was assigned.
36
An interesting problem arises as to whether or not the
attorney who does work for a minor may possess a lien for his
fees out of the legal services which he has performed. It is
generally thought that since a minor is liable for services which
are necessaries, an attorney's fee for prosecuting the minor's
claim could be so classified, thus rendering the minor's estate
liable. How could the minor prosecute some claims without
the aid of counsel? 37
In a startling Missouri decision-Fenn v. Hart Dairy Com-
pany3 8 -this theory was completely rejected. The court adopted
the reasoning found in an old Vermont case,39 stating that
necessaries are only those things which are of "necessity" to the
minor. The Missouri court then gave this term its narrowest
possible meaning, stating that since the minor is not brought into
court under any compulsion, the suit is not a necessity.40 It even
brought in the argument that the statute of limitations does not
33 6 Ohio Jur. 2d 97, Atty. at Law, Sec. 83.
34 Bailey v. Toledo & 0. C. R. Co., 30 Ohio Nisi Prius (New Series) 366
(1905).
35 Pennsylvania Co. v. Thatcher, 78 Ohio State 175 (1908).
36 Ibid., 189-190.
37 Troiani, Problems of Attorney's Fees .... Arising from a Minor's Tort
Claim, 1957, Wash. U. L. Q. 264.
38 231 Mo. App. 1005 (1935).
39 Thrall v. Wright, 38 Vt. 494 (1865).
40 Supra, note 38.
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begin to run on his cause of action until he reaches majority.41
The Fenn case was labeled an unfortunate decision,42 for the
court created a situation in which attorneys representing minors
can only hope that the minor will not disaffirm his agreement.
Members of the Cuyahoga County (Cleveland) Bar in Ohio
are in a more fortunate position. Pursuant to the Ohio Code4"
the Probate Courts are authorized to set up rules of procedure.
Rule 25 concerns counsel fees in connection with settlement of
claims for wrongful death, conscious pain and suffering, claims
for personal injuries to persons under guardianship, and settle-
ment of personal injuries to minors.44 According to Rule 25,
in cases wherein representation is on a contingent basis, counsel
will be allowed maximum fees on the amount obtained in ac-
cordance with the following schedule:
331/3% of the first $10,000
30% of the next $10,000
25% of the balance in excess of $20,000,
provided, however, that additional compensation may be granted
on a showing of extraordinary services. 45
The right of an attorney to either a general or special lien
may be waived, as is true of most other rights. The lien may
be given up upon the acceptance by the attorney of some se-
41 Supra, note 38.
42 Troiani, supra, note 37.
43 Ohio Rev. Code, § 2101.04: "The several judges of the probate court shall
make rules regulating the practice and conducting the business of the court,
which they shall submit to the supreme court. In order to maintain regu-
larity and uniformity in the proceedings of all the probate courts, the su-
preme court may alter and amend such rules and make other rules."
44 Ohio Rev. Code, § 2111.18: "When personal injury, damage to tangible
or intangible property, or damage or loss on account of personal injury or
damage to tangible or intangible property is caused to a ward by wrongful
act, neglect, or default which would entitle the ward to maintain an action
or recover damages therefor, the guardian of the estate of such ward may
adjust and settle said claim with the advice, approval and consent of the
probate court. In such settlement, if the ward is a minor, the parent or
parents may waive all claim for damages on account of loss of service of
such minor, and such claim may be included in such settlement; provided,
that when it is proposed that the claim involved be settled for one thousand
dollars or less, the court may, upon application by any person whom the
court may authorize to receive and receipt for such settlement, authorize
such settlement without the appointment of a guardian and authorize the
delivery of said moneys to the natural guardian of the minor, to the person
by whom the minor is maintained or to the minor himself. Such court may
authorize such minor or person receiving such moneys to execute a com-
plete telease on account thereof. Such payment shall be a complete and
final discharge of any such claim."
45 Rule 25 of the Probate Court of Cuyahoga County, Ohio.
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curity for his claim. Should the attorney then be dismissed by
his client he has no lien upon papers filed by him in court and,
therefore, would not be able to withdraw them.46  Similarly,
should the attorney without proper cause divest himself of the
attorney-client relationship and withdraw from the case, he con-
sequently surrenders any lien which he might otherwise have
held. Under certain circumstances, 47 the Ohio Court of Common
Pleas has jurisdiction to entertain a proceeding for the cancella-
tion of a lien for attorney's fees.
48
Should a judgment-debtor attempt to assign his judgment
to defeat an attorney's lien which has once attached, the lien
will not be defeated despite the fact that the assignee was with-
out notice of the lien.49 As has already been stated, the attorney
cannot acquire such an interest in his client's cause of action
as will put him in the place of the client and make the judgment-
debtor answerable to him. However, where the client effects a
compromise or settlement without the attorney's consent, the lien
will not be defeated but will attach to the proceeds of the
settlement.50
From the foregoing, the status of the law on attorneys'
liens obviously is extremely confused and inadequate. Statutory
enactments, rather than judicial interpretation, are needed in
order to clarify the situation.
The previous foregoing discussion was concerned primarily
with the liens of a plaintiff's attorney. A word concerning the
rights of the defendant's attorney is in order. Only seven states
have specifically provided for a lien for the defense attorney
where he has filed a counterclaim, 51 but only two states have
made a statutory effort to provide the defendant's attorney with
a charging lien. 5 2 At least one law compiler takes the view that
46 Dodson v. Riddle, 1 Ohio Decision Reprints 54 (1844).
47 Ohio Rev. Code, § 707.28. This statute represents a highly technical and
narrow situation which results from the division of property and funds
which must be made when a village is created from a township.
48 Eastlake v. Davis, 94 Ohio App. 71 (1952).
49 Hinman v. Rogers, 4 Ohio Decision Reprints 303 (1878).
50 Supra, note 30.
51 Idaho Code, Vol. 2, Sec. 3-205 (1953); Mo. Rev. Stat., Vol. 27, Sec. 484-
130 (1949); Mont. Rev. Code, Vol. 7, Sec. 93-2120 (1947); Nev. Comp. L.,
Vol. 4, Sec. 8923 (1929); N. Y. Judiciary L., Issue 2, 1957, Part I of Consoli-
dated Laws Service, Vol 6, Sec. 475; Okla. Stat. (1951), Title 5, Sec. 6; Utah
Judicial Code (1953), Sec. 78-51-41.
52 Georgia Code (1933), Vol. 4, Sec. 9-613 (5); La. Rev. Stat. (1950), Vol.
1, Sec. 9:5001.
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there may be instances in which the defendant's attorney also
has such a right.5s
Dean Stevens has suggested a model attorney's lien statute
which is set out as follows: 54
A PROPOSED ATTORNEY'S LIEN STATUTE
ATTORNEY'S LIENS: Extent, notice, priority, enforcement and
release.
A-EXTENT:
An attorney has a lien for the general balance of all com-
pensation due him from his client, for professional services to
such client whether especially agreed upon or implied, as pro-
vided in this section:
1-Upon all papers, personal property and money of his
client in his possession;
2-Upon any claim, cause of action or defense placed in
the attorney's hands, which shall attach to a verdict,
report, determination, decision, judgment, decree or final
order in his client's favor of any court, or, of any state,
municipal, federal or other governmental agency, and to
any money or property, real or personal, which may be
recovered, or cleared, as a result of such claim, cause of
action, or defense, no matter in whose hands (including
governmental agencies) such money or property, real
or personal, may be; provided however, that this section
shall not apply where the money or property involved
is specifically excepted from claims or liens by law.
B-NOTICE SUFFICIENT TO CREATE THE LIEN: Parties affected:
1-Possession of papers, personal property or money by
the attorney shall be sufficient notice to create the lien
as against all the world.
2-Notice, in writing, to the adverse party or, where the
adverse party is represented by counsel, to his attorney,
that the attorney has been retained with respect to a
53 6 Ohio Jur. 2d 94, Atty. at Law, Sec. 79; 5 Am. Jur. 396, Atty. at Law,
Sec. 224.
54 Stevens, supra, note 4, at 20-21. It might be noted that there is one Ohio
statute which deals with attorney's liens: Ohio Rev. Code § 5719.20. Being
under title 57 it deals with the very narrow field of liens on land for money
advanced to pay taxes:
"Each attorney, agent, guardian or executor seized or having the care of
lands who is subjected to any trouble or expense in paying the taxes there-
on, or advances his own money for listing or paying the taxes thereon, shall
be allowed a reasonable compensation for the time spent, the expenses in-
curred, and the money advanced, which shall be a just charge against the
person for whose benefit it was advanced."
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particular claim, cause of action or defense, shall be
sufficient to create the lien as to the adverse party and
his assignees, and no further or additional notice shall
be required.
3-The commencement of an action, suit, proceeding or
hearing on the claim or cause of action or the filing of
a defense thereto, in a court or before any state, mu-
nicipal, federal or other governmental agency, shall be
deemed sufficient notice to create the lien as against all
the world, and no further or additional notice shall be
required.
C-P oium: When the lien provided in Section A attaches
by virtue of Section B, it shall be superior:
1-To all other liens, except tax liens and liens of record
properly perfected prior thereto, and
2-To any settlement or assignment by or between the
parties or third persons, or any of them, made thereafter.
D-ENFORCEMENT AND RELEASE OF LrEN: The Superior Court,
upon petition of an attorney claiming the lien, or of the
client or an interested third party contesting the amount
or validity of a claim of lien, may proceed summarily, with-
out a jury, on not less than five (5) days' notice to in-
terested parties, to adjudicate the rights of the parties in-
volved on the issues raised, and enforce, continue, or release
such lien on such terms and conditions as justice may re-
quire.
This proposal is an excellent starting point or basis upon
which to build an Ohio Attorney's Lien Statute. Obviously,
certain allowances, exceptions and changes would have to be
made to bring it into conformity with general matters of Ohio
jurisprudence. The enactment of such legislation would un-
doubtedly not only serve to clarify the existing status, but would
surely prove of manifest and just value to the members of the
Ohio Bar. It also is desirable, as is shown above, in a number
of other states.
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